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Face-­‐to-­‐face	  conversation	  is	  often	  considered	  the	  most	  basic	  form	  of	  language	  use,	  
as	  it	  was	  likely	  a	  dominant	  mode	  of	  communication	  as	  languages	  evolved,	  it	  is	  often	  
the	  primary	  form	  of	  language	  input	  during	  children’s	  language	  acquisition,	  and	  it	  is	  a	  
dominant	  mode	  of	  adult	  communication	  today.	  Conversational	  language	  differs	  in	  
important	  ways	  from	  the	  language	  traditionally	  studied	  in	  psycholinguistics;	  thus,	  
characterizing	  language	  processing	  in	  conversation	  is	  essential	  if	  models	  of	  
language	  understanding	  are	  to	  extend	  to	  this	  most	  basic	  form	  of	  language	  use.	  This	  
chapter	  will	  examine	  key	  features	  of	  language	  comprehension	  in	  conversation,	  and	  
will	  highlight	  the	  role	  of	  the	  visual	  environment	  in	  establishing	  joint	  domains	  of	  
reference.	  Unlike	  in	  non-­‐interactive	  settings,	  in	  conversation	  language	  is	  jointly	  
created	  by	  conversational	  partners	  who	  hold	  different,	  but	  partially	  overlapping	  
representations	  of	  the	  relevant	  context.	  Understanding	  if	  and	  how	  partners	  
appreciate	  their	  partner’s	  perspective	  has	  emerged	  as	  a	  central	  question	  in	  this	  
domain.	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Conversational	  language	  differs	  in	  important	  ways	  from	  the	  language	  traditionally	  
studied	  in	  psycholinguistics.	  Conversation	  is	  situated	  in	  a	  context	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  
the	  language	  itself.	  This	  context	  may	  constitute	  the	  physical	  environment	  of	  the	  
interlocutors,	  their	  shared	  history,	  the	  dialog	  itself,	  or	  some	  other	  combination	  of	  
jointly	  established	  contextual	  knowledge.	  Conversation	  is	  also	  critically	  shaped	  by	  
the	  fact	  that	  it	  involves	  the	  participation	  of	  at	  least	  two	  individuals.	  The	  result	  of	  
multiple	  participation	  is	  that	  comprehension	  and	  production	  processes	  occur	  
together	  in	  the	  moment;	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  split	  turns,	  in	  which	  one	  dialog	  partner	  
finishes	  the	  other’s	  utterance,	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  this	  (Poesio	  &	  Rieser,	  2010;	  
Purver	  &	  Kempson,	  2004).	  Thus,	  language	  in	  conversation	  is	  jointly	  created	  (Clark,	  
1992)	  and	  as	  such	  cannot	  be	  fully	  understood	  if	  processes	  of	  only	  one	  of	  the	  
participants	  are	  isolated	  and	  studied.	  Other	  central	  features	  of	  conversation	  that	  are	  
often	  absent	  in	  laboratory	  speech	  (unless	  they	  are	  the	  object	  of	  study)	  include	  the	  
presence	  of	  disfluency	  (Arnold,	  Tanenhaus,	  Altmann,	  &	  Fagnano,	  2004),	  gesture	  
(Clark	  &	  Krych,	  2004;	  Schegloff,	  1984;	  Levy	  &	  McNeil,	  1992),	  backchannels	  and	  
other	  forms	  of	  feedback	  (Clark	  and	  Schaefer,	  1989;	  Roque	  &	  Traum,	  2008).	  Each	  of	  
these	  features	  makes	  the	  form	  of	  language	  in	  conversation	  different	  than	  the	  form	  
typically	  studied	  in	  standard	  psycholinguistic	  paradigms.	  While	  methodological	  
innovations	  including	  the	  Visual	  World	  Paradigm	  (Tanenhaus,	  et	  al.,	  1995;	  also	  see	  
Cooper,	  1974;	  Pechmann,	  1989,	  as	  well	  as	  Spivey	  &	  Huette,	  this	  volume,	  and	  
Pyykkönnen	  &	  Crocker,	  this	  volume)	  support	  the	  study	  of	  contextualized	  language,	  
implementations	  of	  this	  paradigm	  often	  lack	  the	  fully	  fledged	  interactivity	  that	  is	  
typical	  of	  natural	  conversation.	  
Unlike	  language	  use	  in	  conversation,	  laboratory	  language	  is	  typically	  
constrained	  in	  various	  ways	  in	  order	  to	  carefully	  control	  the	  language	  under	  study.	  
Often,	  language	  production	  and	  language	  comprehension	  processes	  are	  studied	  
separately,	  thus	  speakers	  produce	  and	  understand	  language	  in	  isolation.	  In	  language	  
production	  studies,	  the	  speaker	  is	  typically	  not	  the	  originator	  of	  the	  ideas	  she	  
speaks;	  instead	  many	  methodologies	  require	  speakers	  to	  repeat	  back	  a	  sentence,	  or	  
to	  describe	  aspects	  of	  a	  scene	  selected	  by	  the	  experimenter.	  While	  these	  
methodological	  controls	  afford	  consistency	  of	  productions	  across	  subjects,	  they	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excise	  from	  the	  language	  production	  process	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  of	  the	  first,	  and	  perhaps	  
most	  important	  step	  in	  language	  production:	  the	  formulation	  of	  the	  to-­‐be-­‐
communicated	  message	  (see	  Konopka	  &	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  2014).	  Similarly,	  in	  
language	  comprehension	  studies,	  listeners	  are	  generally	  asked	  to	  interpret	  a	  series	  
of	  unrelated	  sentences.	  Often	  these	  sentences	  are	  pre-­‐recorded	  (or	  pre-­‐typed,	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  studies	  of	  reading),	  and	  thus	  unlike	  conversation,	  they	  are	  not	  created	  in-­‐
the-­‐moment	  for	  that	  particular	  addressee.	  
Consider	  the	  following	  examples.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  series	  of	  linguistic	  stimuli	  
presented	  to	  participants	  in	  an	  experiment	  by	  Trude	  and	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  (2012).	  In	  
this	  study,	  participants	  listened	  to	  ~700	  instructions	  like	  those	  in	  (a),	  one	  after	  the	  
other.	  Compare	  these	  linguistic	  stimuli	  with	  the	  language	  in	  (b),	  which	  is	  an	  excerpt	  
of	  a	  conversation	  from	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  and	  Tanenhaus	  (2008).	  In	  this	  study,	  pairs	  of	  
naïve	  participants	  (1	  and	  2)	  worked	  together	  to	  arrange	  blocks	  in	  a	  visual	  display.	  
	  
(a)	  	   Click	  on	  tag.	  
	   	   Click	  on	  back.	  
	   	   Click	  on	  wig.	  
	  
(b)	   1.	  	   umm	  pushed	  down	  far	  down	  on	  to	  the	  top	  of	  the	  green	  is	  a	  little	  blue	  one	  
	   2.	   blue	  square?	  
	   1.	   yeah	  blue	  square	  
	   2.	   got	  it	  
	   1.	   ok	  	  
	   2.	   alright	  um…now…thuh	  um…go	  left	  from	  the	  blue	  square	  
	   1.	   yeah	  
	   2.	   there	  should	  be	  four	  spaces	  between	  that…and	  a	  penguin	  
	   1.	   a	  penguin	  
	  
In	  both	  experiments,	  a	  critical	  dependent	  measure	  was	  the	  eye	  movements	  that	  
addressees	  made	  as	  they	  resolved	  lexical	  competition	  between	  cohort	  competitors	  
in	  the	  visual	  display.	  For	  example,	  Trude	  and	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  examined	  fixations	  to	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a	  picture	  of	  a	  bag	  when	  addressees	  interpreted	  the	  word	  back.	  In	  contexts	  in	  which	  
both	  “bag”	  and	  “back”	  are	  potential	  referents,	  the	  shared	  initial	  phoneme	  results	  in	  
competition	  between	  the	  two	  words,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  an	  initial	  rise	  in	  the	  likelihood	  
of	  a	  fixation	  to	  both	  referents	  (Allopenna,	  et	  al.,	  1998).	  Similarly,	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  
and	  Tanenhaus	  (2008)	  examined	  fixations	  to	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  pencil	  when	  addressees	  
interpreted	  the	  word	  penguin.	  The	  form	  of	  the	  language	  in	  (b)	  is	  arguably	  more	  
typical	  of	  every-­‐day	  language	  use,	  yet	  the	  language	  in	  (a)	  is	  more	  typical	  of	  the	  
scripted	  stimuli	  used	  in	  psycholinguistic	  research.	  The	  question,	  then,	  is	  whether	  
these	  differences	  matter	  for	  the	  phenomena	  of	  interest.	  	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  central	  phenomenon	  of	  interest	  in	  research	  
on	  language	  processing	  is	  (or	  should	  be)	  how	  language	  is	  processed	  in	  everyday	  
settings.	  Certainly,	  procedures	  such	  as	  reading,	  or	  listening	  to	  pre-­‐recorded	  
announcements	  are	  everyday	  behaviors.	  However,	  neither	  is	  more	  canonical,	  
prevalent,	  or	  basic	  as	  everyday	  conversation.	  For	  example,	  the	  American	  Time	  Use	  
Survey	  (US	  Dept	  of	  Labor,	  2010)	  reports	  that	  in	  2009,	  Americans	  spent	  
approximately	  42	  minutes	  a	  day	  devoted	  to	  socializing	  and	  communicating—this	  
was	  more	  than	  three	  times	  as	  much	  time	  spent	  on	  phone	  calls,	  mail	  and	  e-­‐mail	  
combined	  (12	  minutes)1.	  While	  the	  quantity	  of	  all	  of	  these	  activities	  paled	  in	  
comparison	  to	  television	  watching	  (169	  minutes),	  I	  argue	  that	  TV	  is	  a	  less	  basic	  form	  
of	  language	  use	  given	  that	  it	  is	  a	  modern	  development	  and	  not	  ubiquitous	  globally	  
(at	  least	  not	  at	  such	  high	  quantities).	  A	  further	  consideration	  is	  that	  not	  all	  
languages	  are	  written	  and	  even	  in	  modern	  societies,	  some	  proportion	  of	  the	  
population	  is	  illiterate:	  The	  US	  national	  estimate	  for	  adults	  lacking	  “basic	  prose	  
literacy	  skills”	  was	  14	  percent	  (2003,	  National	  Center	  for	  Education	  Statistics).	  
Unlike	  television	  and	  text,	  spoken	  language	  is	  the	  form	  of	  speech	  that	  infants	  learn	  
                                                 
1These	  data	  come	  from	  a	  15	  minute	  telephone	  survey	  of	  civilian	  adults	  over	  age	  15.	  These	  values	  
include	  only	  the	  primary	  activity	  and	  do	  not	  include	  any	  co-­‐occurrent	  activity.	  Socializing	  and	  
communicating	  is	  defined	  as	  “face-­‐to-­‐face	  social	  communication	  and	  hosting	  or	  attending	  social	  
functions.”	  Thus,	  uses	  of	  language	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  another	  activity	  (e.g.,	  cooking)	  is	  not	  included	  
in	  this	  estimate,	  and	  likely	  accounts	  for	  the	  intuitively	  low	  estimate.	  	  In	  2013	  the	  values	  were	  43	  
minutes	  per	  day	  for	  socializing	  and	  communicating,	  9	  minutes	  for	  phone,	  mail	  and	  email	  combined,	  
and	  166	  minutes	  for	  TV.	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to	  speak	  their	  language	  from.	  Exposure	  to	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  language	  preserves	  the	  loss	  of	  
non-­‐native	  consonants,	  but	  exposure	  to	  pre-­‐recorded	  audio	  or	  video	  does	  not	  (Kuhl,	  
Tsao,	  &	  Liu,	  2003).	  Similarly,	  exposure	  to	  infant-­‐directed	  media	  does	  not	  increase	  
vocabulary	  learning	  and	  is	  significantly	  less	  helpful	  than	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interaction	  in	  
the	  acquisition	  of	  new	  words	  (DeLoache,	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  
If	  we	  grant,	  then,	  that	  conversational	  language	  is	  the	  most	  basic	  form	  of	  
language	  use	  worldwide	  and	  across	  the	  lifespan,	  we	  must	  consider	  whether	  the	  
results	  of	  investigations	  of	  language	  in	  other	  forms,	  such	  as	  reading,	  listening	  to	  
scripted	  sentences	  as	  in	  (a),	  etc.	  will	  extend	  to	  conversation.	  Answering	  this	  
question	  will	  require	  the	  examination	  of	  language	  processing	  in	  conversational	  
settings.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  research	  will	  indicate	  which	  findings	  from	  laboratory	  
settings	  do	  and	  do	  not	  generalize	  to	  everyday	  conversation,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  boundary	  
conditions	  that	  determine	  whether	  a	  finding	  will	  generalize.	  Studies	  of	  conversation	  
also	  provide	  opportunities	  to	  make	  basic	  observations	  about	  mechanisms	  of	  
language	  processing	  in	  every-­‐day	  settings,	  which	  in	  turn,	  can	  be	  tested	  in	  more	  
controlled	  laboratory	  settings,	  or	  in	  blended	  experiments	  that	  combine	  features	  of	  
controlled	  experiments	  with	  features	  of	  natural	  conversation.	  This	  pairing	  of	  
naturalistic	  studies	  with	  more	  tightly	  controlled	  traditional	  experiments	  will	  afford	  
a	  more	  complete	  understanding	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  everyday	  language	  processing	  
than	  could	  be	  had	  from	  traditional	  laboratory	  studies	  alone.	  	  
This	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  interactive	  conversation,	  and	  explores	  how	  
conversational	  partners,	  also	  known	  as	  interlocutors,	  coordinate	  meaning	  in	  
conversation.	  In	  particular,	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  establishing	  a	  referential	  
domain,	  within	  which	  referring	  expressions	  are	  produced	  and	  interpreted.	  This	  
chapter	  focuses	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  referential	  domains	  are	  shaped	  in	  
conversation,	  and	  the	  implications	  this	  has	  for	  language	  understanding.	  In	  doing	  so,	  
I	  lay	  out	  the	  case	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  insights	  gained	  from	  the	  study	  of	  conversational	  
language	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  different	  in	  important	  ways	  than	  the	  insights	  that	  can	  be	  
obtained	  by	  studying	  the	  scripted	  language	  typical	  of	  laboratory	  investigations.	  In	  
the	  final	  section,	  I	  outline	  two	  alternative	  views	  of	  how	  referential	  domains	  might	  be	  




All	  language	  is	  understood	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  context,	  whether	  it	  be	  the	  
context	  of	  a	  conversation,	  the	  context	  of	  a	  paragraph	  in	  a	  book,	  or	  the	  context	  of	  a	  
psycholinguistic	  experiment.	  The	  domain	  within	  which	  referring	  expressions	  are	  
produced	  and	  interpreted	  is	  known	  as	  the	  referential	  domain.	  Classic	  research	  on	  
reference	  in	  context	  demonstrates	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  referring	  expressions	  to	  the	  
contents	  of	  the	  referential	  domain	  (Olson,	  1970;	  Osgood,	  1971).	  Imagine,	  for	  
example,	  we	  wish	  to	  refer	  to	  Nabokov’s	  novel,	  Pale	  Fire.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  a	  large	  
library,	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  book,	  one	  would	  have	  to	  first	  mention	  both	  the	  title	  and	  the	  
author	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  referential	  domain	  within	  which	  the	  expression,	  the	  
book,	  could	  be	  interpreted.	  In	  a	  context	  with	  only	  a	  few	  books,	  successful	  reference	  
could	  be	  established	  by	  mentioning	  the	  color	  of	  the	  dust	  jacket,	  e.g.,	  the	  blue	  book.	  In	  
a	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  conversation,	  a	  pointing	  gesture	  could	  be	  used	  to	  further	  narrow	  the	  
referential	  domain,	  allowing	  the	  speaker	  to	  use	  a	  pronoun,	  as	  in	  Is	  this	  a	  good	  read?	  	  
This	  dependence	  on	  context	  places	  a	  premium	  on	  understanding	  what	  the	  
relevant	  context,	  or	  referential	  domain,	  is	  when	  understanding	  language.	  In	  the	  
words	  of	  Lila	  and	  Henry	  Gleitman,	  “A	  picture	  is	  worth	  a	  thousand	  words,	  but	  that’s	  
the	  problem”	  (Gleitman	  &	  Gleitman,	  1992,	  emphasis	  added).	  The	  world	  is	  always	  a	  
source	  of	  context;	  what	  is	  unclear	  is	  which	  part	  of	  the	  world	  is	  the	  relevant	  part.	  
How	  is	  it	  that	  we	  dice	  up	  the	  world	  into	  smaller	  referential	  domains?	  This	  is	  a	  
problem	  that	  interlocutors	  appear	  to	  seamlessly	  and	  effortlessly	  solve,	  yet	  one	  that	  
is	  a	  serious	  problem	  for	  theories	  of	  language	  use.	  This	  chapter	  explores	  two	  ways	  in	  
which	  referential	  domains	  are	  established	  and	  circumscribed	  in	  conversation.	  The	  
first	  is	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  joint	  attention.	  The	  second	  is	  through	  
representations	  of	  the	  perspective	  of	  one’s	  dialog	  partner.	  	  
	  
Joint	  Attention	  
The	  ability	  of	  communication	  partners	  to	  coordinate	  is	  often	  viewed	  as	  a	  
prerequisite	  to	  successful	  communication	  (Clark,	  1996;	  Clark	  &	  Brennan,	  1991);	  
when	  attention	  is	  coordinated,	  communication	  is	  thought	  to	  improve	  (Brennan,	  et	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al.,	  2008;	  Richardson	  &	  Dale,	  2005).	  According	  to	  one	  theory,	  coordinated	  attention	  
during	  conversation	  improves	  communication	  by	  minimizing	  joint	  collaborative	  
effort	  (Clark	  &	  Brennan,	  1991;	  Gergle,	  Kraut,	  &	  Fussell,	  2004a,b).	  If	  attention	  is	  
coordinated,	  then	  speakers	  and	  listeners	  will	  produce	  and	  understand	  language	  
with	  respect	  to	  the	  same	  context,	  and	  thus	  both	  production	  and	  interpretation	  
processes	  should	  be	  more	  efficient.	  
Interlocutors	  can	  coordinate	  attention	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways,	  including	  gaze	  
(Richardson	  &	  Dale,	  2005;	  Richardson,	  Dale,	  &	  Kirkham,	  2007),	  gesture	  (Bangerter,	  
2004;	  Clark	  &	  Krych,	  2004),	  and	  actions	  in	  a	  joint	  workspace	  (Brennan,	  2005).	  
Furthermore,	  coordination	  of	  phonetic	  form	  (Pardo,	  2006),	  syntactic	  form	  (Levelt	  &	  
Kelter,	  1982;	  Branigan,	  Pickering,	  &	  Cleland,	  2000;	  Haywood,	  Pickering	  &	  Branigan,	  
2005;	  Reitter	  &	  Moore,	  2007;	  Reitter,	  Moore,	  &	  Keller,	  2006),	  and	  task	  schemas	  
(Garrod	  &	  Anderson,	  1987;	  Schober,	  1993),	  as	  well	  as	  mimicry	  and	  coordination	  of	  
body	  movements	  and	  posture	  (Chartrand	  &	  Bargh,	  1999;	  Kendon,	  1970)	  also	  
emerge	  during	  dialog	  and	  may	  further	  reflect	  interlocutors’	  representational	  
alignment	  (see	  Pickering	  &	  Garrod,	  2004).	  Consistent	  with	  the	  view	  that	  
interlocutors	  coordinate	  in	  order	  to	  minimize	  collaborative	  effort	  (Clark	  &	  Schaefer,	  
1989;	  Clark	  &	  Wilkes-­‐Gibbs,	  1986),	  partner	  mimicry	  effects	  may	  increase	  rapport	  
and	  facilitate	  communication	  (LaFrance,	  1979;	  LaFrance	  &	  Broadbent,	  1976;	  
Chartrand	  &	  Bargh,	  1999;	  Richardson	  &	  Dale,	  2005),	  even	  in	  human-­‐computer	  
interactions	  (Bailenson	  &	  Yee,	  2005).	  
The	  present	  focus	  is	  on	  how	  coordination	  of	  attention	  can	  be	  used	  to	  support	  
successful	  communication	  in	  conversation	  by	  establishing	  joint	  referential	  domains.	  
In	  particular,	  this	  section	  focuses	  on	  gaze,	  gesture,	  and	  action	  as	  mechanisms	  for	  this	  
coordination.	  See	  Chapter	  9	  of	  this	  volume	  (Knoeferle),	  for	  an	  in-­‐depth	  treatment	  of	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  visual	  context	  in	  sentence	  comprehension.	  
	  
Gaze	  
Shifts	  in	  gaze	  are	  linked	  to	  shifts	  in	  attention,	  and	  the	  direction	  of	  fixation	  is	  
typically	  taken	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  direction	  of	  attention	  (see	  Irwin,	  2004	  for	  
discussion	  of	  this	  assumption).	  Gaze	  is	  also	  an	  important	  source	  of	  social	  and	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attentional	  information	  in	  human	  development	  and	  learning.	  From	  infancy,	  humans	  
are	  sensitive	  to	  the	  direction	  of	  adult	  gaze	  (Morales,	  Mundy,	  &	  Rojas,	  1998;	  Morales,	  
et	  al.,	  2000;	  Caron	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Deák,	  Flom	  &	  Pick,	  2000;	  Scaife	  &	  Bruner,	  1975),	  and	  
18-­‐month-­‐old	  infants	  can	  use	  speaker	  gaze	  and	  gestures	  to	  learn	  the	  name	  for	  a	  
novel	  object	  (Baldwin,	  1991;	  1993;	  also	  see	  Moses,	  Baldwin,	  Rosicky,	  &	  Tidball,	  
2001).	  Adults,	  too,	  can	  use	  the	  information	  about	  speaker	  gaze	  to	  learn	  novel	  words	  
in	  an	  unfamiliar	  language	  (Yu,	  Ballard	  &	  Aslin,	  2005).	  	  
The	  role	  of	  gaze	  extends	  beyond	  that	  of	  an	  attentional	  cue	  and	  a	  source	  of	  
information	  during	  language	  acquisition.	  Gaze	  can	  also	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  on-­‐
line	  language	  processing,	  and	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  reliable	  indicator	  of	  communicative	  
success.	  	  
Imagine	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  dialog	  partner	  glances	  to	  the	  side	  and	  remarks,	  
That’s	  neat!	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  addressee	  can	  use	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  speaker’s	  gaze	  
to	  narrow	  the	  referential	  domain	  to	  a	  subset	  of	  entities	  in	  the	  general	  direction	  of	  
the	  speaker’s	  gaze,	  thus	  facilitating	  interpretation	  of	  what	  would	  otherwise	  be	  an	  
underinformative	  expression.	  Hanna	  and	  Brennan	  (2007)	  demonstrated	  that	  
addressees	  do	  just	  that.	  Participants	  in	  their	  experiment	  interpreted	  expressions	  
like	  the	  blue	  circle	  with	  five	  dots	  on	  it,	  in	  contexts	  that	  contained	  two	  blue	  circles,	  one	  
with	  five	  dots	  and	  one	  with	  six	  dots,	  and	  several	  objects	  of	  other	  colors.	  In	  a	  visual	  
scene	  such	  as	  this	  one,	  the	  expression	  is	  temporarily	  ambiguous	  between	  the	  two	  
blue	  circles.	  The	  ambiguity	  is	  resolved	  linguistically	  at	  the	  point-­‐of-­‐disambiguation	  
(Eberhard,	  et	  al.,	  1995),	  which	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  task	  is	  the	  word	  five.	  Hanna	  and	  
Brennan	  asked	  if	  speaker	  gaze	  could	  allow	  addressees	  to	  resolve	  this	  ambiguity	  
earlier	  than	  the	  point-­‐of-­‐disambiguation.	  They	  hypothesized	  that	  addressees	  might	  
use	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  speaker’s	  gaze	  to	  narrow	  the	  referential	  domain	  to	  a	  subset	  
of	  the	  task	  context.	  To	  test	  this	  hypothesis,	  they	  created	  situations	  in	  which	  pairs	  of	  
naïve	  participants	  were	  seated	  on	  opposite	  sides	  of	  a	  visual	  display	  in	  which	  the	  




Figure	  1.	  	  Gaze	  directs	  attention,	  narrowing	  the	  referential	  domain.	  Example	  display	  
adapted	  from	  Hanna	  and	  Brennan	  (2007),	  Figure	  1.	  Scene	  contains	  (left	  to	  right):	  
yellow	  circle-­‐3	  dots,	  blue	  circle-­‐5	  dots	  (the	  target),	  green	  square,	  red	  square-­‐2	  dots,	  
blue	  circle-­‐6	  dots	  (the	  competitor),	  green	  triangle.	  The	  speaker	  gazes	  to	  her	  right,	  
excluding	  the	  competitor	  from	  the	  referential	  domain.	  
	  
In	  one	  condition,	  two	  blue	  circles	  were	  on	  opposite	  sides	  of	  the	  display	  (see	  
Fig.	  1).	  Speaker	  gaze	  typically	  precedes	  reference	  to	  named	  objects	  by	  about	  900	  ms	  
(Griffin	  &	  Bock,	  2000),	  thus	  as	  speakers	  in	  this	  experiment	  prepared	  to	  say	  the	  blue	  
circle…,	  their	  gaze	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  reliable	  cue	  to	  speaker	  meaning.	  Addressees	  
were	  highly	  sensitive	  to	  this	  cue,	  and	  within	  the	  first	  few	  hundred	  milliseconds	  after	  
the	  onset	  of	  the	  adjective	  blue,	  fixations	  to	  the	  target	  referent	  rose	  quickly,	  with	  
addressees	  identifying	  the	  gazed-­‐at	  blue	  circle	  as	  the	  intended	  referent.	  This	  finding	  
demonstrates	  that	  gaze	  is	  a	  source	  of	  information	  that	  addressees	  use	  to	  reduce	  
referential	  ambiguity.	  Gaze	  narrowed	  the	  referential	  domain	  to	  objects	  in	  the	  
direction	  of	  the	  speaker’s	  fixation.	  Within	  this	  limited	  referential	  domain,	  the	  
referring	  expression	  was	  no	  longer	  ambiguous.	  	  
This	  result	  is	  in	  line	  with	  other	  findings	  that	  giving	  one	  dialogue	  partner	  
information	  about	  the	  other	  partner’s	  gaze	  (real	  or	  simulated)	  can	  facilitate	  task	  
performance.	  For	  example,	  Brennan,	  et	  al.	  (2008;	  also	  Neider,	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  asked	  
pairs	  of	  eye-­‐tracked	  participants	  to	  complete	  spatial	  tasks	  in	  which	  they	  had	  to	  
search	  for	  a	  target	  in	  a	  scene	  with	  competitor	  (e.g.,	  an	  O	  in	  the	  context	  of	  many	  Qs).	  
Providing	  pairs	  with	  information	  about	  where	  their	  partner	  was	  looking	  (a	  live	  feed	  
from	  the	  eye-­‐tracker	  was	  displayed	  on	  their	  screen)	  speeded	  target	  identification—
even	  more	  so	  than	  when	  partners	  could	  talk	  to	  each	  other,	  or	  even	  when	  they	  could	  
talk	  and	  see	  their	  partner’s	  gaze.	  Again,	  it	  seems	  that	  information	  about	  a	  partner’s	  
gaze	  was	  used	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  narrow	  the	  relevant	  domain,	  in	  this	  case,	  in	  a	  visual	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search	  task.	  The	  fact	  that	  gaze	  could	  be	  such	  a	  powerful	  communicative	  tool—even	  
more	  powerful	  than	  language	  itself—provides	  evidence	  that	  modes	  of	  
communication	  other	  than	  spoken	  language	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  communicative	  
processes.	  	  
Gaze	  is	  not	  only	  a	  source	  of	  information	  for	  communicative	  partners,	  but	  it	  
also	  provides	  a	  good	  measure	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  coordination	  in	  conversation.	  For	  
example,	  Richardson,	  et	  al.	  (2007;	  also	  see	  Richardson	  &	  Dale,	  2005;	  Richardson,	  
Dale,	  &	  Tomlinson,	  2009)	  monitored	  the	  eye	  movements	  of	  participants	  as	  they	  
conversed	  about	  the	  painting	  Nature	  Morte	  Vivante	  by	  Salvador	  Dali.	  Prior	  to	  their	  
discussion,	  the	  speakers	  heard	  either	  the	  same	  or	  a	  different	  informational	  passage	  
about	  Dali	  (either	  about	  the	  painting,	  or	  about	  Dali	  himself).	  When	  partners	  had	  the	  
same	  background	  experience—the	  same	  common	  ground	  (Clark	  &	  Marshall,	  
1981)—their	  gaze	  during	  the	  subsequent	  conversation	  was	  significantly	  more	  
coordinated.	  That	  is,	  when	  one	  partner	  looked	  at	  an	  element	  of	  the	  painting,	  the	  
other	  partner	  looked	  too	  (with	  some	  lag	  of	  course,	  as	  speech-­‐related	  gaze	  precedes	  
speech	  and	  comprehension-­‐related	  gaze	  follows	  it).	  Similarly,	  Richardson	  and	  Dale	  
(2005)	  recorded	  speakers	  talking	  about	  a	  TV	  show	  as	  they	  gazed	  at	  images	  of	  key	  
cast	  members.	  Later,	  a	  group	  of	  listeners	  listened	  to	  the	  recordings	  while	  viewing	  
the	  images	  of	  the	  cast.	  Again,	  gaze	  proved	  a	  powerful	  indicator	  of	  communicative	  
success:	  the	  more	  highly	  correlated	  speaker	  and	  listener	  gaze	  was,	  the	  more	  
successful	  the	  communication	  (as	  evidenced	  by	  listeners’	  answers	  to	  
comprehension	  questions).	  Thus	  in	  this	  task,	  when	  attention	  (measured	  by	  the	  
direction	  of	  gaze)	  was	  similar,	  communication	  was	  more	  successful,	  likely	  in	  part	  
due	  to	  similar	  referential	  domains.	  	  
These	  insights	  about	  human	  attention	  and	  referential	  domains	  are	  relevant	  
not	  only	  to	  theories	  of	  language	  processing,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  field	  of	  artificial	  
intelligence.	  The	  virtual	  human,	  Max,	  developed	  by	  the	  artificial	  intelligence	  group	  
at	  the	  University	  of	  Bielefeld,	  Germany,	  is	  one	  good	  example.	  Max	  is	  an	  incredibly	  
convincing	  virtual	  dialog	  partner.	  He	  makes	  use	  of	  information	  about	  a	  human’s	  
gaze	  and	  pointing	  gestures	  to	  assess	  their	  focus	  of	  attention.	  In	  doing	  so,	  Max	  is	  able	  
to	  establish	  joint	  attention	  with	  the	  human	  communicative	  partner,	  and	  increase	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fluidity	  of	  the	  interaction	  (see	  Pfeiffer-­‐Leßmann,	  &	  Wachsmuth,	  2009;	  Wachsmuth,	  
2008).	  Information	  about	  the	  human	  partner’s	  attention,	  in	  combination	  with	  
emotion	  simulation,	  intention	  recognition,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  give	  feedback	  in	  
conversation	  (Becker-­‐Asano	  &	  Wachsmuth,	  2010;	  Wachsmuth,	  2008),	  make	  the	  
experience	  of	  interacting	  with	  Max	  seem	  virtually	  real.	  
	  
Actions	  and	  Gesture	  
	   In	  conversations	  about	  entities	  in	  the	  co-­‐present	  world,	  referential	  domains	  
can	  further	  be	  circumscribed	  by	  body	  movements,	  such	  as	  pointing	  gestures,	  and	  
actions	  in	  the	  environment.	  	  
	   During	  a	  lengthy	  conversation,	  the	  partners’	  conversational	  history	  serves	  as	  
a	  resource	  for	  information	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  circumscribe	  domains.	  Take,	  for	  
example,	  the	  dialog	  presented	  in	  example	  (b).	  In	  that	  study,	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  and	  
Tanenhaus	  (2008)	  examined	  the	  interpretation	  of	  expressions	  like	  the	  penguin	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  both	  the	  target	  referent	  (a	  block	  with	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  penguin	  on	  it),	  and	  
a	  competitor	  referent	  (a	  block	  with	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  pencil).	  They	  compared	  
expressions	  that	  were	  produced	  during	  the	  course	  of	  a	  ~2	  hour	  conversation	  in	  
which	  partners	  worked	  together	  to	  arrange	  blocks	  in	  the	  same	  pattern	  on	  their	  
respective	  game	  boards.	  In	  typical	  studies	  of	  speech	  perception	  using	  the	  visual	  
world	  paradigm	  (Tanenhaus,	  et	  al.,	  1995),	  both	  a	  penguin	  and	  a	  pencil	  would	  be	  
present	  on	  the	  display,	  and	  would	  thus	  both	  be	  potential	  referents.	  Those	  studies	  
typically	  find	  that	  shortly	  after	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  word	  penguin,	  the	  addressee	  
launches	  fixations	  to	  both	  the	  penguin	  and	  the	  pencil,	  with	  roughly	  equal	  likelihood,	  
until	  disambiguating	  phonetic	  information	  is	  heard	  (Allopenna,	  et	  al.,	  1998).	  In	  these	  
studies,	  various	  sources	  of	  information,	  such	  as	  subphonemic	  coarticulatory	  
information	  (Dahan,	  et	  al.,	  2001),	  information	  about	  a	  particular	  speaker’s	  referring	  
tendencies	  (Creel,	  Aslin,	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  2008),	  and	  information	  about	  a	  particular	  
speaker’s	  vowel	  shift	  (Trude	  &	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  2012)	  all	  modulate	  this	  process.	  
	   How	  is	  this	  type	  of	  lexical	  competition	  resolved	  during	  conversation?	  To	  
address	  this	  question,	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  and	  Tanenhaus	  first	  examined	  interpretation	  
of	  these	  expressions	  for	  language	  outside	  the	  context	  of	  the	  conversation	  itself.	  To	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do	  this,	  they	  had	  the	  experimenter	  refer	  to	  various	  game	  pieces	  on	  the	  board	  as	  in	  
Look	  at	  the	  penguin,	  ok…	  Look	  at	  the	  lamp….	  	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  typical	  cohort	  
competition	  effect	  was	  replicated,	  with	  an	  early	  rise	  in	  fixations	  to	  both	  alternatives.	  
In	  contrast,	  reference	  to	  the	  exact	  same	  game	  pieces	  made	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  
conversation	  elicited	  no	  detectable	  competition	  effects.	  Addressees	  were	  no	  more	  
likely	  to	  look	  at	  competitors	  than	  unrelated	  blocks	  (e.g.,	  a	  candle	  when	  interpreting	  
candy).	  Instead,	  in	  most	  cases	  listeners	  had	  already	  focused	  visual	  attention	  on	  the	  
target	  prior	  to	  the	  referring	  expression,	  and	  did	  not	  direct	  attention	  away	  from	  the	  
target	  when	  hearing	  a	  word	  that	  was	  temporarily	  consistent	  with	  a	  competitor.	  
Further,	  in	  situations	  where	  listeners	  were	  not	  already	  fixating	  the	  target	  prior	  to	  
the	  target	  word,	  fixations	  to	  the	  target	  rose	  rapidly	  following	  target	  word	  onset,	  and	  
there	  was	  no	  detectable	  competition	  effect.	  	  
	  
Figure	  2.	  Task	  constraints	  narrow	  the	  referential	  domain:	  Screenshot	  from	  Brown-­‐
Schmidt	  and	  Tanenhaus	  (2008).	  Participant	  is	  fixating	  the	  “candy”,	  indicated	  by	  
white	  crosshair.	  The	  yellow	  circle	  indicates	  the	  possible	  referential	  domain;	  the	  
competitor,	  “candle”	  (highlighted	  by	  a	  red	  square)	  is	  outside	  the	  hypothesized	  
referential	  domain.	  	  
	  
	  
	   This	  effect	  was	  interpreted	  as	  a	  referential	  domain	  effect.	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  
and	  Tanenhaus	  argued	  that	  the	  interlocutors	  constrained	  their	  referential	  domains	  
to	  such	  small	  areas	  of	  the	  board	  that	  the	  expressions	  were	  no	  longer	  ambiguous:	  
that	  is,	  the	  candle	  (when	  interpreting	  candy)	  was	  simply	  not	  a	  competitor.	  Further	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analyses	  examined	  how	  the	  domains	  came	  to	  be	  constrained.	  While	  up	  to	  57	  
potential	  referents	  were	  on	  the	  board	  at	  any	  given	  time,	  speakers	  and	  addressees	  
only	  considered	  those	  that	  had	  been	  mentioned	  recently,	  that	  were	  relevant	  to	  the	  
task,	  and	  were	  in	  close	  physical	  proximity	  to	  the	  last	  mentioned	  object.	  Similar	  task-­‐
based	  constraints	  have	  been	  found	  to	  constrain	  referring	  in	  other	  task-­‐related	  
conversations	  (Beun	  &	  Cremers,	  1998;	  also	  see	  Landragin,	  2006),	  suggesting	  these	  
effects	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  particular	  task	  used	  in	  this	  study.	  	  
	   Lexical	  competition	  during	  spoken	  word	  recognition	  can	  be	  attenuated	  by	  
other	  constraints	  as	  well,	  including	  semantic	  information	  (Barr,	  2008),	  talker	  
preferences	  (e.g.,	  if	  one	  talker	  always	  says	  candy,	  and	  a	  different	  talker	  always	  says	  
candle,	  Creel,	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  and	  structural	  priming	  of	  verbs	  (Thothathiri	  &	  Snedeker,	  
2008).	  	  Possible	  actions	  in	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  conversation	  can	  also	  constrain	  domains.	  For	  
example,	  Hanna	  &	  Tanenhaus	  (2004)	  demonstrated	  that	  during	  a	  task-­‐based	  
conversation	  in	  which	  a	  confederate	  (someone	  pretending	  to	  be	  a	  genuine	  
participant)	  was	  following	  a	  recipe	  to	  bake	  a	  cake	  along	  with	  a	  participant,	  that	  the	  
confederate’s	  ability	  to	  reach	  to	  certain	  items	  in	  the	  workspace	  constrained	  which	  
items	  were	  considered	  relevant.	  On	  critical	  trials,	  the	  context	  contained	  two	  boxes	  of	  
cake	  mix,	  one	  of	  which	  the	  confederate	  could	  reach	  with	  her	  hands,	  and	  one	  of	  
which	  she	  could	  not,	  and	  she	  asked	  the	  participant	  to	  put	  the	  cake	  mix….	  In	  cases	  
where	  the	  confederate’s	  hands	  were	  empty,	  the	  expression	  was	  interpreted	  as	  
referring	  to	  the	  cake	  mix	  that	  the	  confederate	  could	  not	  reach.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  
competitor	  was	  considered	  outside	  the	  referential	  domain	  because	  if	  the	  
confederate	  had	  wanted	  that	  cake	  mix,	  she	  would	  have	  reached	  for	  it	  herself.	  In	  
contrast,	  when	  the	  confederate’s	  hands	  were	  full,	  both	  boxes	  of	  cake	  mix	  were	  
considered.	  This	  result	  indicates	  that	  the	  referential	  domain	  is	  changed	  by	  the	  
possible	  actions	  that	  could	  be	  performed	  in	  a	  situation.	  
Executed	  actions	  play	  other	  roles	  in	  conversation	  as	  well,	  including	  acting	  as	  
a	  stand-­‐in	  for	  language,	  and	  providing	  tangible	  evidence	  of	  understanding.	  
Providing	  shared	  visual	  information	  as	  conversational	  participants	  complete	  a	  joint	  
task	  affords	  the	  use	  of	  actions	  in	  the	  place	  of	  words.	  Clark	  and	  Krych	  (2004)	  found	  
that	  listeners	  used	  pointing	  gestures	  and	  actions	  such	  as	  holding	  a	  block	  in	  a	  certain	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location	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  listener’s	  understanding	  during	  task-­‐based	  
conversation.	  When	  the	  joint	  workspace	  was	  hidden	  from	  the	  speaker,	  they	  
observed	  that	  pairs	  tended	  to	  spend	  more	  time	  checking	  whether	  a	  previous	  action	  
was	  correct	  or	  not.	  Pairs	  with	  visible	  workspaces	  also	  tended	  to	  use	  more	  deictic	  
expressions,	  particularly	  expressions	  like	  like	  this,	  or	  like	  that—these	  expressions	  
were	  frequently	  combined	  with	  gestures	  in	  which	  an	  action	  was	  demonstrated	  (e.g.,	  
does	  it	  go	  “like	  that”?).	  Similarly,	  Gergle,	  Kraut,	  and	  Fussell	  (2004b)	  asked	  one	  
participant	  to	  instruct	  another	  participant	  on	  how	  to	  assemble	  a	  4-­‐piece	  puzzle	  on	  a	  
computer,	  and	  manipulated	  whether	  the	  director	  saw	  a	  live	  view	  of	  the	  matcher’s	  
workspace.	  Having	  a	  view	  of	  the	  matcher’s	  workspace	  changed	  how	  they	  partners	  
completed	  the	  task.	  When	  the	  director	  could	  see	  the	  workspace,	  actions	  in	  the	  
workspace	  took	  the	  place	  of	  talk.	  These	  actions	  established	  whether	  the	  matcher	  
correctly	  understood	  or	  not,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  there	  were	  fewer	  verbal	  
acknowledgments	  of	  having	  moved	  a	  piece	  when	  workspaces	  were	  shared.	  
An	  open	  question	  is	  how	  referential	  domains	  might	  be	  constrained	  in	  other	  
situations.	  Take,	  for	  example,	  a	  discussion	  about	  a	  movie.	  During	  the	  movie	  itself,	  
scenes	  change	  rapidly,	  and	  viewers	  may	  not	  keep	  track	  of	  even	  noteworthy	  changes	  
to	  the	  objects	  in	  those	  scenes	  (Simons	  &	  Chabris,	  1999).	  Scene	  changes	  result	  in	  
rapidly	  changing	  object	  locations	  and	  viewpoints,	  and	  thus	  the	  relative	  location	  of	  
potential	  referents.	  As	  a	  result,	  physical	  proximity,	  which	  is	  a	  constraint	  that	  
features	  strongly	  in	  task-­‐based	  conversation	  (Brown-­‐Schmidt	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  2008;	  
Beun	  &	  Cremers,	  1998;	  Hanna	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  2004),	  may	  play	  less	  of	  a	  role.	  Further,	  
segmentation	  of	  events	  may	  separate	  entities	  into	  separate	  referential	  domains,	  in	  
both	  visual	  event	  perception	  (see	  Zacks,	  2004)	  but	  also	  in	  the	  comprehension	  of	  
narrative	  and	  possibly	  non	  task-­‐based	  dialog	  (see	  Speer	  &	  Zacks,	  2005;	  Greene,	  et	  
al.,	  1994).	  These	  event	  representations	  may	  include	  expectations	  for	  unmentioned	  
or	  unobserved	  changes	  (e.g.,	  Altmann	  &	  Kamide,	  2009).	  The	  semantic	  structure	  of	  
complex	  events	  may	  also	  constrain	  domains.	  Physical	  and	  semantic	  constraints	  on	  
the	  action	  of	  putting	  something	  “inside”	  narrows	  the	  domain	  of	  interpretation	  of	  a	  
sentence	  like	  Put	  the	  cube	  inside	  the	  can	  to	  container-­‐like	  goal	  locations	  that	  are	  
physically	  compatible	  with	  the	  object	  to	  be	  put	  (Chambers,	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  also	  see	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Dahan	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  2004).	  Similarly,	  information	  about	  the	  indexical	  
characteristics	  of	  event	  participants	  constrains	  the	  possible	  events	  they	  may	  engage	  
in	  (Kamide,	  Altmann,	  &	  Haywood,	  2003;	  Tesink,	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  van	  Berkum,	  et	  al.,	  
2008).	  For	  example,	  in	  an	  analysis	  of	  event-­‐related	  potentials	  to	  auditorily	  
presented	  sentences,	  van	  Berkum,	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  found	  that	  listeners	  incorporated	  
information	  about	  the	  age	  and	  gender	  of	  a	  talker	  into	  their	  interpretation	  of	  
sentences.	  They	  found	  that	  mismatches	  between	  the	  talker	  and	  the	  information	  
communicated	  by	  the	  sentence,	  such	  as	  Every	  evening	  I	  drink	  some	  wine	  before	  I	  go	  
to	  sleep,	  spoken	  by	  a	  child	  elicited	  significantly	  larger	  N400	  responses	  to	  the	  critical	  
word	  wine,	  in	  comparison	  to	  a	  case	  where	  the	  speaker’s	  identity	  was	  consistent	  with	  
the	  information	  being	  conveyed	  (e.g.,	  an	  adult).	  	  
These	  expectations	  based	  on	  semantic	  and	  indexical	  information	  are	  
consistent	  with	  a	  view	  that	  interlocutors	  maintain	  detailed	  representations	  of	  
contextual	  information.	  These	  partner-­‐specific	  representations	  also	  include	  the	  
perspective	  of	  one’s	  partner,	  a	  topic	  we	  turn	  to	  next.	  
	  
Perspective-­Taking	  
	   In	  dialog,	  appreciating	  the	  knowledge	  state	  of	  one’s	  interlocutor	  may	  be	  
important	  for	  how	  the	  addressee	  understands	  language.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  
excerpt	  (c)	  of	  dialog	  from	  the	  television	  show	  “Friends”2.	  
(c)	  
Phoebe:	  They	  don't	  know	  that	  we	  know	  they	  know	  we	  know!	  Joey,	  you	  can't	  
say	  anything!	  
Joey:	  I	  couldn't	  even	  if	  I	  wanted	  too.	  
	  
In	  this	  exchange,	  the	  characters	  are	  discussing	  the	  mutual	  awareness	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  characters	  Monica	  and	  Chandler	  are	  secretly	  dating.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  TV	  
series	  and	  this	  particular	  episode,	  the	  secretive	  dating	  and	  knowledge	  of	  this	  fact	  are	  
well-­‐established.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  convoluted	  sentence,	  “They	  don't	  know	  that	  we	  
                                                 
2 From Season 5 Episode 14, “The One Where Everybody Finds Out”. Transcript 
available from friends.wikia.com. See Cohen (2010) for discussion. 
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know	  they	  know	  we	  know!”	  becomes	  interpretable.	  Establishing	  a	  meaning	  for	  this	  
sentence	  outside	  of	  a	  rich	  context	  is	  difficult	  because	  it	  involves	  the	  calculation	  of	  at	  
least	  four	  embedded	  mental	  states	  (knowing	  of	  knowing	  of	  knowing	  of	  knowing).	  
However,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  show,	  the	  experience,	  knowledge	  and	  goals	  (i.e.,	  to	  
deceive)	  are	  salient,	  and	  interpretation	  of	  such	  multiply	  embedded	  statements	  
comes	  fairly	  naturally.3	  According	  to	  one	  proposal	  (Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  2009a),	  these	  
mental-­‐state	  calculations	  should	  be	  facilitated	  in	  situations	  where	  the	  listener	  is	  
participating	  in	  a	  live	  conversation,	  rather	  than	  passively	  listening	  (e.g.,	  to	  the	  
television),	  as	  a	  live	  interaction	  provides	  better	  opportunity	  to	  firmly	  establish	  what	  
is	  and	  is	  not	  jointly	  known.	  The	  fact	  that	  sentences	  such	  as	  They	  don't	  know	  that	  we	  
know	  they	  know	  we	  know!	  can	  be	  successfully	  interpreted	  when	  watching	  television	  
may	  benefit	  from	  the	  build-­‐up	  of	  information	  throughout	  the	  episode,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
viewer’s	  familiarity	  with	  the	  show.	  Whether	  understanding	  of	  such	  sentences	  would	  
be	  even	  easier	  in	  a	  live	  conversation,	  remains	  to	  be	  tested.	  
	   How	  is	  it	  that	  interlocutors	  compute	  mental	  states	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  
can	  be	  rapidly	  deployed	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  understanding	  language—even	  
language	  as	  convoluted	  as	  the	  above	  example?	  According	  to	  Clark	  and	  Marshall	  
(1981)	  interlocutors	  establish	  enough	  mutual	  knowledge	  for	  the	  current	  purposes	  
based	  on	  co-­‐presence	  heuristics	  and	  assumptions	  about	  simultaneity	  of	  attention	  
(among	  others).	  In	  Clark	  and	  Marshall’s	  view,	  to	  establish	  a	  physically	  co-­‐present	  
object	  as	  part	  of	  the	  interlocutors’	  joint	  knowledge	  or	  common	  ground,	  interlocutors	  
represent	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  given	  entity	  is	  mutually	  known	  if	  the	  entity	  and	  both	  
interlocutors	  are	  co-­‐present,	  and	  the	  interlocutors	  have	  evidence	  of	  each	  other’s	  
mutual	  attention	  to	  this	  entity.	  Other	  forms	  of	  co-­‐presence	  include	  linguistic	  and	  
cultural	  co-­‐presence.	  On	  their	  view,	  information	  about	  the	  co-­‐presence	  of	  entities	  
and	  individuals	  is	  stored	  in	  rich,	  diary-­‐like	  representations.	  This	  evidence	  for	  
common	  ground	  varies	  in	  strength,	  such	  that	  some	  evidence	  offers	  a	  strong	  case	  to	  
                                                 
3 Rich semantic and contextual information can similarly assuage challenging syntactic 
constructions. The problematic syntactic structure in The horse raced past the barn fell is 
much easier to interpret when the lexical affordances are consistent with the syntactic 
structure, as in Whiskey fermented in oak barrels can have a woody taste (see McRae, 
Hare, & Tanenhaus, 2005).  
 17 
assume	  common	  ground	  (e.g.,	  we	  are	  both	  jointly	  looking	  at	  an	  object),	  whereas	  
other	  evidence	  only	  provides	  weak	  support	  for	  common	  ground.	  In	  particular,	  Clark	  
and	  Marshall	  (1978)	  suggest	  that	  linguistically	  mentioning	  something	  provides	  
weaker	  evidence	  for	  common	  ground	  compared	  to	  immediate	  physical	  co-­‐presence,	  
because	  something	  mentioned	  in	  the	  past	  can	  only	  be	  considered	  common	  ground	  if	  
the	  listener	  remembers	  what	  was	  said	  (among	  other	  criteria).	  These	  
representations	  of	  joint	  knowledge,	  whether	  weak	  or	  strong,	  are	  accessed	  in	  the	  
service	  of	  language.	  In	  example	  (c),	  the	  interlocutors	  would	  maintain	  information	  
about	  each	  other’s	  knowledge	  states,	  based	  on	  mutually	  observed	  events,	  such	  as	  
visual	  evidence	  of	  an	  affair,	  or	  previous	  discussion	  of	  said	  affair.	  Access	  to	  these	  rich	  
representations	  would	  then	  allow	  the	  character	  Phoebe	  in	  (c)	  to	  comment	  on	  
another	  person’s	  lack	  of	  knowing.	  
	   This	  view	  of	  common	  ground	  posits	  a	  central	  role	  for	  explicit	  memory	  
processes	  in	  the	  use	  of	  mutual	  knowledge.	  Another	  view,	  proposed	  by	  Horton	  
(Horton	  &	  Gerrig,	  2005a,	  b;	  Horton	  2007)	  posits	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  explicit	  
recollection	  of	  joint	  experience,	  I	  remember	  when	  Phoebe	  and	  I…,	  common	  ground	  is	  
formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  low-­‐level	  associations	  between	  individuals	  and	  information.	  
These	  associations	  could	  support	  use	  of	  language	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  sensitive	  to	  the	  
common	  ground	  between	  individuals,	  without	  requiring	  that	  the	  sources	  of	  that	  
information	  (jointly	  experienced	  events)	  be	  explicitly	  accessed	  from	  declarative	  
memory	  during	  language	  use	  itself.	  
	   Understanding	  whether	  the	  representations	  underlying	  common	  ground	  are	  
strictly	  episodic,	  diary-­‐like	  representations,	  or	  whether	  there	  is	  an	  association-­‐
based	  component	  as	  well	  is	  a	  critical	  question	  for	  future	  research.	  The	  answer	  has	  
implications	  for	  understanding	  if	  and	  when	  common	  ground	  could	  guide	  language	  
processing.	  Common	  ground	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  play	  a	  powerful	  role	  in	  
comprehension	  during	  conversation	  because	  it	  could	  constrain	  the	  domain	  of	  
interpretation	  to	  information	  relevant	  to	  the	  dialog,	  based	  on	  the	  partner’s	  
perspective.	  For	  example,	  when	  interpreting	  an	  imperative,	  Pick	  up	  your	  toy!,	  the	  
referent	  of	  toy	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  some	  entity	  mutually	  known	  to	  speaker	  and	  listener.	  If	  
it	  was	  unknown	  to	  the	  speaker,	  she	  wouldn’t	  refer	  to	  it,	  and	  if	  it	  was	  unknown	  to	  the	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addressee,	  the	  speaker	  would	  need	  to	  provide	  more	  information	  if	  she	  wanted	  her	  
command	  to	  be	  understood.	  By	  contrast,	  when	  interpreting	  a	  question	  like	  What	  did	  
you	  buy?,	  the	  question	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  asking	  about	  something	  known	  to	  the	  
addressee	  but	  not	  the	  speaker	  (see	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  2005).	  How	  does	  common	  
ground	  constrain	  the	  domain	  of	  interpretation	  for	  language?	  Here	  we	  consider	  how	  
establishment	  of	  common	  ground	  can	  influence	  referential	  domains,	  particularly	  
focusing	  on	  common	  ground	  for	  physically	  co-­‐present	  objects,	  and	  linguistically	  co-­‐
present	  entities.	  For	  a	  different	  view	  on	  the	  role	  of	  common	  ground	  in	  language	  see	  
Chapter	  11	  of	  this	  volume	  (Barr).	  
	  
Physical	  co-­presence	  
	   Consider	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  two	  people	  sit	  face	  to	  face,	  across	  a	  table	  from	  
each	  other.	  In	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  situations,	  the	  dialog	  partners	  have	  different	  physical	  
viewpoints	  on	  a	  scene,	  resulting	  in	  different	  perspectives	  (Figure	  3).	  
	  
Figure	  3.	  	  In	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  conversation,	  some	  entities	  are	  mutually	  visible	  (the	  white	  
star	  and	  white	  triangle),	  and	  thus	  in	  common	  ground.	  Other	  entities	  might	  be	  
occluded	  by	  a	  barrier	  (the	  black	  triangle),	  or	  located	  out	  of	  Partner	  B’s	  sight	  (the	  
black	  star),	  and	  thus	  in	  Partner	  A’s	  privileged	  ground.	  
	  
According	  to	  some	  views	  of	  language	  use,	  common	  ground	  is	  the	  basic	  context	  with	  
respect	  to	  which	  language	  is	  produced	  and	  interpreted	  (Clark,	  1992;	  1996).	  On	  this	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view,	  appreciation	  of	  which	  entities	  are	  and	  are	  not	  physically	  co-­‐present	  would	  be	  
a	  basic,	  and	  routine	  component	  of	  both	  language	  production	  and	  language	  
comprehension	  processes.	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  while	  Partner	  A	  in	  Figure	  3	  sees	  
two	  stars,	  he	  would	  not	  need	  to	  modify	  his	  expression	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  one	  on	  the	  
table,	  as	  the	  star	  would	  be	  perfectly	  interpretable	  from	  Partner	  B’s	  point	  of	  view.	  
Similarly,	  if	  Partner	  B	  were	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  triangle,	  Partner	  A	  should	  understand	  her	  
to	  mean	  the	  white	  triangle,	  as	  the	  black	  triangle	  is	  not	  visible	  from	  Partner	  B’s	  
perspective.	  
	   These	  predictions	  are	  not	  entirely	  consistent	  with	  the	  observed	  patterns	  of	  
behavior	  in	  language	  production	  and	  comprehension.	  Instead,	  the	  literature	  
suggests	  that	  common	  ground	  only	  partially	  constrains	  referential	  domains.	  
Consider	  the	  case	  of	  Partner	  A’s	  interpretation	  of	  B’s	  expression,	  the	  triangle,	  in	  a	  
sentence	  like	  Pick	  up	  the	  triangle	  and	  move	  it	  next	  to	  the	  star.	  Evidence	  from	  the	  
analysis	  of	  eye	  movements	  in	  situations	  similar	  to	  this	  one	  show	  that	  addressees	  do	  
sometimes	  consider	  the	  privileged	  (black)	  triangle	  (Keysar,	  Lin,	  &	  Barr,	  2003;	  
Hanna,	  Tanenhaus,	  &	  Trueswell,	  2003),	  suggesting	  that	  information	  about	  what	  
information	  is	  common	  and	  privileged	  is	  not	  an	  absolute	  constraint	  on	  the	  
referential	  domain.	  However,	  it	  is	  a	  partial	  constraint:	  addressees	  in	  Partner	  A’s	  
perspective	  are	  significantly	  less	  likely	  to	  gaze	  at	  a	  privileged	  competitor	  compared	  
to	  one	  in	  common	  ground	  (Hanna,	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  also	  see	  Heller,	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Chambers	  
&	  San	  Juan,	  2008).	  In	  language	  production,	  speakers	  show	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  
perspective	  of	  the	  addressee	  (Nadig	  &	  Sedivy,	  2002)	  or	  addressees	  (Yoon	  &	  Brown-­‐
Schmidt,	  2014),	  designing	  expressions	  that	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  addressee’s	  
perspective	  at	  least	  part	  of	  the	  time.	  Taken	  together,	  these	  findings	  are	  consistent	  
with	  constraint-­‐based	  views	  of	  common	  ground	  (Brown-­‐Schmidt	  &	  Hanna,	  2011;	  
Hanna,	  et	  al.,	  2003),	  which	  propose	  that	  common	  ground	  is	  one	  of	  many	  partial	  
constraints	  on	  language	  processing.	  
	   In	  the	  situation	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  3,	  information	  about	  what	  is	  common	  or	  
privileged	  is	  provided	  by	  visual	  cues	  in	  the	  context,	  what	  Clark	  and	  Marshall	  (1978)	  
termed	  physical	  co-­presence.	  This	  is	  the	  most	  typical	  type	  of	  situation	  studied	  in	  
experiments	  on	  common	  ground.	  However,	  Clark	  and	  Marshall	  outlined	  another	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scenario	  for	  the	  visual	  establishment	  of	  common	  ground,	  delayed	  physical	  co-­
presence.	  Imagine	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  Partners	  A	  and	  B	  jointly	  gaze	  at	  the	  white	  
star,	  but	  then	  the	  star	  falls	  off	  the	  table,	  out	  of	  view.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  white	  star	  had	  
been	  established	  in	  common	  ground	  at	  one	  point	  would	  then	  allow	  reference	  to	  it	  
after	  some	  delay.	  Little	  research	  directly	  investigates	  this	  source	  of	  information	  
about	  common	  ground.	  In	  one	  study,	  listeners	  did	  not	  use	  delayed	  physical	  co-­‐
presence	  to	  guide	  referential	  processing	  (Ryskin,	  et	  al.,	  2014),	  though	  another	  study	  
that	  used	  simpler	  displays	  and	  shorter	  delays	  did	  find	  sensitivity	  to	  previously-­‐
established	  physical	  co-­‐presence	  (Ferguson	  &	  Breheny,	  2012).	  Understanding	  the	  
constraints	  on	  the	  use	  of	  delayed	  physical	  co-­‐presence	  remains	  an	  important	  
question	  for	  future	  work;	  considerations	  of	  the	  memory	  demands	  involved	  (Horton	  
&	  Gerrig,	  2005a;	  Rubin,	  et	  al.,	  2011)	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  relevant.	  
A	  different	  way	  of	  establishing	  common	  ground	  is	  through	  the	  use	  of	  
language,	  that	  is,	  by	  mentioning	  new	  information	  to	  your	  dialog	  partner	  that	  was	  
previously	  privileged.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  we	  discuss	  evidence	  for	  how	  linguistic	  
cues	  to	  common	  ground	  guide	  language	  processing.	  
	  
Linguistic	  co-­presence	  
	   For	  any	  two	  individuals,	  their	  beliefs	  and	  knowledge	  are	  necessarily	  non-­‐
identical.	  Thus,	  much	  of	  conversation	  involves	  exchanging	  information	  that	  was	  
previously	  not	  mutually	  known.	  In	  this	  way,	  dialog	  partners	  take	  information	  that	  
was	  previously	  privileged	  and	  make	  it	  linguistically	  co-­present.	  How	  does	  linguistic	  
co-­‐presence	  compare	  to	  physical	  co-­‐presence	  as	  a	  source	  of	  information	  about	  
common	  ground?	  Clark	  and	  Marshall	  (1978)	  suggested	  that	  linguistic	  co-­‐presence	  
provides	  weaker	  evidence	  for	  common	  ground,	  in	  part	  because	  interlocutors	  have	  to	  
remember	  what	  was	  mentioned,	  whereas	  physical	  co-­‐presence	  (the	  immediate	  
kind)	  is	  available	  in	  the	  here	  and	  now.	  The	  limited	  empirical	  evidence	  on	  this	  




	  	   	   	  
	   	   (a)	   	   	   	   	   	   (b)	  
Figure	  4.	  	  Example	  scene	  from	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  et	  al.	  (2008),	  from	  the	  
experimenter’s	  (a)	  and	  participant’s	  (b)	  perspective.	  Displays	  are	  mirror-­‐reversed.	  
Animals	  in	  white	  squares	  are	  visually	  co-­‐present,	  and	  animals	  in	  black/gray	  squares	  
are	  visually	  privileged.	  
	  
Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  Gunlogson,	  and	  Tanenhaus	  (2008;	  also	  see	  replication	  by	  
Ryskin,	  et	  al.,	  2014)	  examined	  the	  use	  of	  common	  ground	  as	  participants	  
interpreted	  informational	  questions	  like	  What’s	  below	  the	  cow	  with	  shoes?,	  given	  
scenes	  like	  the	  one	  in	  Figure	  4.	  In	  this	  example,	  the	  underlined	  portion	  of	  the	  
question	  is	  temporarily	  ambiguous	  between	  asking	  about	  the	  animal	  below	  the	  cow	  
with	  shoes	  (the	  target)	  and	  the	  animal	  below	  the	  cow	  with	  glasses	  (the	  competitor).	  
However,	  the	  animal	  below	  the	  cow	  with	  glasses	  is	  already	  common	  ground	  (the	  
horse	  with	  the	  hat).	  Thus,	  if	  participants	  can	  use	  physical	  co-­‐presence	  to	  constrain	  
the	  referential	  domain	  to	  things	  appropriate	  to	  ask	  questions	  about,	  then	  the	  
question	  is	  disambiguated	  at	  the	  word	  cow.	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  compared	  
this	  condition	  to	  a	  case	  in	  which	  the	  competitor	  was	  visually	  privileged,	  but	  
linguistically	  mentioned	  prior	  to	  the	  critical	  question.	  The	  results	  were	  the	  same	  
across	  the	  two	  conditions:	  When	  common	  ground	  (physical	  or	  linguistic)	  ruled	  out	  
the	  competitor,	  participants	  began	  to	  look	  at	  the	  target	  more	  than	  the	  competitor	  
shortly	  after	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  critical	  noun,	  cow.	  	  
These	  results	  suggest	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  some	  circumstances,	  physical	  and	  
linguistic	  sources	  can	  provide	  equally	  good	  information	  about	  common	  ground.	  By	  
contrast,	  failures	  to	  use	  delayed	  physical	  co-­‐presence	  (Ryskin,	  et	  al.,	  2014)	  may	  be	  
due	  to	  problems	  in	  maintaining	  and/or	  retrieving	  this	  information	  over	  a	  delay	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period.	  Similarly,	  when	  linguistic	  information	  had	  been	  introduced	  a	  long	  time	  ago,	  
memory	  failures	  may	  impair	  use	  of	  common	  ground	  (see	  Rubin,	  et	  al.	  2011).	  	  
	  
Joint	  Attention	  
A	  final	  consideration	  is	  that	  establishing	  common	  ground	  based	  on	  physical	  
and	  linguistic	  co-­‐presence	  requires	  assumptions	  about	  joint	  attention.	  If	  Partner	  A	  
in	  Figure	  3	  had	  his	  eyes	  closed	  it	  would	  not	  be	  appropriate	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  white	  
star	  and	  triangle	  were	  common	  ground.	  Similarly,	  if	  Partner	  A	  were	  to	  say	  There’s	  a	  
black	  star	  behind	  you,	  A	  could	  only	  consider	  the	  black	  triangle	  to	  be	  common	  ground	  
if	  B	  showed	  some	  evidence	  of	  understanding	  the	  utterance.	  If	  B	  was	  listening	  to	  her	  
iPod	  at	  a	  loud	  volume,	  or	  was	  distracted,	  etc.,	  assumptions	  about	  simultaneity	  of	  
attention	  to	  A’s	  speech	  could	  not	  be	  made.	  These	  examples	  illustrate	  the	  importance	  
of	  grounding	  joint	  knowledge.	  According	  to	  classic	  theories	  of	  dialog,	  information	  is	  
only	  entered	  into	  common	  ground	  if	  both	  partners	  accept	  it.	  One	  way	  of	  doing	  this	  is	  
by	  providing	  feedback,	  as	  in	  Ok,	  there’s	  a	  star	  behind	  me,	  thanks!,	  which	  can	  provide	  
varying	  amounts	  of	  information	  for	  whether	  something	  is	  common	  ground	  (see	  
Clark	  &	  Schaefer,	  1989;	  Roque	  &	  Traum,	  2008;	  2009).	  	  
Brown-­‐Schmidt	  (2009b)	  found	  some	  evidence	  that	  partners	  are	  sensitive	  to	  
the	  grounding	  process.	  In	  that	  study,	  participants	  brought	  visually	  privileged	  
animals	  into	  common	  ground	  by	  mentioning	  them.	  Critically,	  the	  feedback	  that	  the	  
experimenter	  gave	  was	  manipulated.	  On	  some	  trials,	  the	  experimenter	  used	  positive	  
feedback,	  as	  in	  Okay.	  In	  other	  cases,	  the	  experimenter	  gave	  negative	  feedback,	  as	  in	  
Sorry,	  I	  didn’t	  get	  that.	  Then,	  participants	  interpreted	  a	  wh-­‐question	  that	  was	  
temporarily	  ambiguous	  between	  asking	  about	  the	  information	  that	  had	  been	  
mentioned,	  and	  something	  that	  had	  not	  been	  discussed.	  Participants	  were	  
significantly	  less	  likely	  to	  consider	  the	  mentioned	  competitor	  when	  the	  
experimenter	  provided	  positive	  feedback	  after	  the	  competitor’s	  identity	  was	  
revealed,	  compared	  to	  a	  case	  where	  the	  experimenter	  provided	  negative	  feedback.	  
This	  result	  suggests	  that	  feedback	  does	  in	  fact	  play	  a	  role	  in	  establishing	  common	  
ground.	  However,	  whether	  fine	  gradients	  between	  different	  forms	  of	  feedback	  are	  
used	  (Clark	  &	  Schaefer,	  1989),	  is	  an	  open	  question.	  In	  some	  of	  the	  only	  work	  to	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address	  this	  latter	  issue,	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  (2012)	  reported	  minimal	  differences	  
between	  the	  following	  forms	  of	  feedback:	  OK	  (see	  d2a),	  repeats	  (d2b),	  and	  
continuations	  of	  the	  discourse	  (d2c).	  
(d)	  
d1.	   Participant:	  	  I	  have	  a	  horse	  with	  a	  hat	  in	  my	  secret	  square.	  
d2a.	   Experimenter:	  	  OK	  
d2b.	   Experimenter:	  Horse	  with	  hat.	  
d2c.	   Experimenter:	  So	  now	  pick	  up	  the	  triangle	  and….	  
Whether	  larger	  effects	  might	  be	  observed	  in	  other	  circumstances	  remains	  to	  be	  
explored.	  
	  
Towards	  a	  model	  of	  domain	  circumscription	  
	   The	  previous	  sections	  outlined	  ways	  in	  which	  referential	  domains	  are	  
circumscribed	  in	  conversational	  settings:	  Eye	  fixations	  can	  limit	  the	  referential	  
domain	  to	  entities	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  speaker’s	  gaze	  (Hanna	  &	  Brennan,	  2007),	  
task	  demands	  can	  limit	  the	  domain	  to	  task-­‐relevant	  or	  recently	  mentioned	  items	  
(Brown-­‐Schmidt	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  2008;	  Beun	  &	  Cremers,	  1998),	  and	  common	  ground	  
can	  limit	  a	  domain	  to	  information	  either	  in	  or	  out	  of	  common	  ground,	  depending	  on	  
utterance	  form	  (i.e.,	  an	  imperative	  vs.	  an	  interrogative;	  Hanna,	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Brown-­‐
Schmidt,	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  
	   These	  examples	  demonstrate	  that	  domain	  circumscription	  reduces	  
competition	  from	  potential	  referents	  during	  interpretation	  of	  a	  referring	  expression.	  
How	  exactly	  is	  this	  ambiguity	  eliminated?	  In	  this	  final	  section,	  I	  discuss	  two	  possible	  
mechanisms	  for	  how	  domains	  might	  be	  circumscribed	  in	  conversation,	  based	  on	  the	  
factors	  discussed	  above.	  The	  first	  possibility	  is	  that	  addressees	  maintain	  a	  single,	  
attentionally-­‐constrained	  referential	  domain.	  This	  account	  is	  contrasted	  with	  a	  view	  
in	  which	  addresses	  maintain	  multiple	  independent	  (and	  potentially	  inconsistent)	  
domains	  (see	  Heller,	  Parisien,	  &	  Stevenson,	  2012	  for	  a	  related	  view).	  
	   The	  first	  possibility	  is	  that	  linguistic,	  pragmatic	  and	  other	  information	  define	  




Figure	  5.	  	  Example	  display.	  Left	  panel:	  	  Shaded	  area	  at	  top	  of	  display	  indicates	  
hypothesized	  referential	  domain	  circumscribed	  by	  the	  word	  above.	  	  Right	  panel:	  
Updated	  scene	  following	  movement	  of	  the	  circle.	  The	  shaded	  area	  at	  the	  left	  side	  of	  
display	  indicates	  referential	  domain	  circumscribed	  by	  the	  word	  left.	  The	  star	  is	  in	  
both	  referential	  domains.	  
	  
Given	  this	  scene,	  if	  a	  subject	  were	  to	  hear	  the	  instruction,	  Put	  the	  circle	  above	  the	  
striped	  green	  square,	  the	  referential	  domain	  during	  interpretation	  of	  the	  second	  
referring	  expression	  (underlined)	  would	  be	  narrowed	  by	  the	  restrictions	  of	  the	  
preposition	  above	  (see	  Chambers,	  et	  al.,	  2002),	  and	  a	  task-­‐based	  constraint	  to	  not	  
allow	  objects	  to	  overlap.	  The	  items	  in	  the	  domain	  would	  therefore	  be	  those	  entities	  
with	  space	  above	  them—the	  star,	  the	  striped	  green	  square,	  and	  the	  triangle	  (Figure	  
5,	  left	  panel).	  On	  this	  view,	  during	  interpretation	  of	  the	  expression	  the	  striped…,	  only	  
those	  three	  entities	  would	  be	  considered	  potential	  referents.	  	  
If	  language	  comprehension	  takes	  place	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  single	  referential	  
domain,	  this	  begs	  the	  question	  of	  how	  domains	  are	  updated	  over	  time.	  If	  the	  
mechanism	  of	  domain	  circumscription	  is	  attentional,	  listeners	  may	  have	  difficulty	  
switching	  attention	  from	  one	  domain	  to	  the	  next,	  even	  after	  the	  first	  domain	  is	  no	  
longer	  relevant	  (see	  Ryskin,	  et	  al.,	  2014	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  switching	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between	  domains).	  In	  the	  above	  example,	  the	  referential	  domain	  was	  initially	  
established	  as	  the	  items	  in	  the	  top	  row—the	  star,	  square	  and	  triangle	  (Figure	  5,	  left	  
panel).	  If	  the	  speaker	  subsequently	  gave	  an	  instruction	  to	  Now	  put	  the	  moon	  to	  the	  
left	  of…,	  the	  word	  left	  would	  change	  the	  referential	  domain	  to	  be	  those	  items	  on	  the	  
left	  side	  of	  the	  display—the	  circle,	  the	  star,	  and	  the	  rectangle	  (Figure	  5,	  right	  panel).	  
If	  switching	  attention	  from	  items	  in	  one	  domain	  to	  items	  in	  a	  different	  domain	  poses	  
difficulties,	  then	  it	  should	  be	  difficult	  to	  interpret	  an	  expression	  that	  references	  an	  
object	  not	  in	  the	  original	  domain	  (e.g.,	  the	  rectangle),	  compared	  to	  an	  object	  which	  
was	  included	  in	  both	  domains	  (e.g.,	  the	  star).	  For	  example,	  the	  noun	  phrase	  the	  star	  
in	  (e1)	  should	  be	  easier	  to	  interpret	  than	  the	  rectangle	  in	  (e2),	  because	  the	  star	  was	  
in	  the	  previous	  referential	  domain.	  
(e1)	  Now	  put	  the	  moon	  to	  the	  left	  of	  the	  star.	  
(e2)	  Now	  put	  the	  moon	  to	  the	  left	  of	  the	  rectangle.	  
	   In	  the	  view	  discussed	  thus	  far,	  interlocutors	  maintain	  one	  referential	  domain	  
at	  a	  time,	  and	  switch	  between	  domains	  as	  the	  conversation	  unfolds.	  How	  else	  might	  
domain	  circumscription	  operate?	  An	  alternative	  possibility	  is	  that	  interlocutors	  
maintain	  multiple	  domains	  in	  working	  memory,	  or	  task	  focus	  (Grosz	  &	  Sidner,	  1986).	  
On	  this	  view,	  different	  domains	  might	  include	  different	  entities,	  not	  all	  of	  which	  
match	  the	  selectional	  restrictions	  of	  the	  incoming	  acoustic	  information	  at	  the	  time.	  	  
The	  advantage	  of	  a	  multiple-­‐domains	  view	  is	  that	  it	  can	  account	  for	  why	  
some	  sentences	  have	  multiple,	  conflicting	  domain	  restrictions.	  Consider	  the	  wh-­‐
questions	  examined	  in	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  et	  al.	  (2008),	  such	  as,	  What’s	  below	  the	  cow	  
with	  shoes?	  	  In	  a	  sentence	  like	  this,	  the	  question	  is	  inquiring	  about	  something	  that	  
must	  be	  in	  the	  addressee’s	  privileged	  ground.	  However,	  interpreting	  the	  question	  
requires	  understanding	  a	  definite	  reference	  to	  something	  in	  common	  ground	  (cow	  
with	  shoes).	  Thus,	  within	  the	  same	  sentence,	  the	  referential	  domain	  must	  shift	  from	  
privileged	  ground,	  to	  common	  ground,	  and	  then	  back	  again	  to	  privileged	  ground,	  in	  
order	  for	  the	  addressee	  to	  answer	  the	  question.	  The	  speed	  with	  which	  such	  
utterances	  are	  interpreted	  (Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  2009b;	  
Ryskin,	  et	  al.,	  2014)	  suggests	  that	  both	  common	  and	  privileged	  information	  are	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available	  at	  once.	  Thus,	  effects	  like	  this	  one	  suggest	  that	  multiple	  conflicting	  
domains	  might	  be	  active	  at	  one	  time.	  
Heller,	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  proposed	  a	  multiple-­‐domains	  view	  of	  perspective-­‐taking	  
in	  which	  interlocutors	  maintain	  separate	  representations	  of	  common	  ground	  and	  
privileged	  ground.	  They	  present	  data	  from	  studies	  of	  language	  production	  and	  
comprehension	  in	  cases	  where	  speaker	  and	  listener	  have	  different	  perspectives.	  
Heller,	  et	  al.’s	  findings	  suggest	  that	  these	  domains	  (common	  ground	  and	  privileged	  
ground)	  are	  probabilistically	  weighted	  and	  combined	  together	  to	  guide	  language	  
production	  and	  comprehension.	  Understanding	  how	  this	  probabilistic-­‐combination	  
view	  speaks	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  changing	  domains	  over	  time	  remains	  an	  important	  
question	  for	  future	  work.	  
	  
General	  Discussion	  
	   This	  chapter	  makes	  the	  strong	  claim	  that	  the	  object	  of	  study	  in	  language	  
processing	  is,	  or	  should	  be,	  the	  most	  basic	  form	  of	  language	  use,	  which	  I	  claim	  is	  
interactive	  conversation.	  Further,	  I	  argue	  that	  engaging	  in	  conversation	  changes	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  language	  is	  processed	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  phenomena	  
under	  investigation.	  The	  bulk	  of	  this	  chapter	  explores	  these	  ideas	  by	  examining	  how	  
referential	  domains	  are	  circumscribed	  during	  interactive	  conversation,	  and	  how	  
interpretation	  of	  referring	  expressions	  is	  shaped	  by	  domain	  circumscription.	  In	  
doing	  so,	  I	  outline	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  conversation	  narrows	  referential	  domains	  and	  
speeds	  processing-­‐-­‐through	  joint	  attention,	  and	  through	  perspective-­‐taking.	  The	  
goal	  of	  this	  final	  section	  is	  to	  summarize	  these	  findings,	  and	  discuss	  how	  they	  
support	  the	  claim	  that	  conversation	  alters	  language	  processing	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  
potentially	  relevant	  to	  the	  theoretical	  questions	  of	  interest.	  	  
	   The	  first	  source	  of	  domain	  circumscription	  I	  described	  is	  joint	  attention	  in	  
conversation.	  In	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  conversation,	  interlocutors	  have	  access	  to	  a	  highly	  
reliable	  cue	  to	  their	  partner’s	  object	  of	  attention,	  gaze.	  Coordination	  of	  gaze	  in	  
conversation	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  joint	  attention,	  and	  as	  such,	  a	  reliable	  
indicator	  of	  communicative	  success	  (Richardson,	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Richardson	  &	  Dale,	  
2005;	  Richardson,	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Gaze	  can	  also	  serve	  as	  an	  early	  cue	  to	  speaker	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meaning	  during	  interpretation	  of	  a	  temporarily	  ambiguous	  referring	  expression	  
(Hanna	  &	  Brennan,	  2007),	  and	  can	  even	  allow	  the	  young	  child	  to	  infer	  the	  meaning	  
of	  a	  novel	  word	  (Baldwin,	  1991;	  1993).	  Similarly,	  actions	  and	  gestures	  in	  a	  joint	  
workspace	  not	  only	  focus	  attention,	  and	  improve	  communicative	  success	  (Clark	  &	  
Krych,	  2004),	  but	  more	  importantly,	  they	  can	  take	  the	  place	  of	  linguistic	  exchanges	  
(Gergle,	  et	  al.,	  2004a,b),	  and	  alter	  the	  linguistic	  forms	  that	  speakers	  do	  use	  (Clark	  &	  
Krych,	  2004).	  While	  these	  physical	  cues	  are	  readily	  and	  naturally	  produced	  in	  
conversation,	  they	  may	  be	  absent	  in	  some	  non-­‐interactive	  forms	  of	  language	  use,	  
such	  as	  reading,	  speaking	  in	  isolation,	  or	  listening	  to	  pre-­‐recorded	  stimuli.	  The	  fact	  
that	  these	  cues	  to	  joint	  attention	  are	  beneficial	  to	  processing	  suggests	  that	  
comprehension	  processes	  may	  be	  impaired	  in	  non-­‐interactive	  settings,	  a	  claim	  
consistent	  with	  findings	  that	  communication	  suffers	  when	  these	  physical	  cues	  are	  
eliminated	  (Clark	  &	  Krych,	  2004;	  Gergle,	  et	  al.,	  2004b;	  Brennan,	  2005).	  Further,	  the	  
tendency	  for	  interlocutors	  to	  rely	  on	  cues	  such	  as	  gaze	  and	  actions	  (e.g.,	  Hanna	  &	  
Brennan,	  2007;	  Clark	  &	  Krych,	  2004)	  suggests	  that	  the	  constraints	  relevant	  to	  
language	  processing	  (i.e.,	  Trueswell	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  1994)	  are	  qualitatively	  different	  
in	  interactive	  settings.	  This	  therefore	  suggests	  that	  conclusions	  regarding	  which	  
sources	  of	  constraint	  are	  central	  to	  language	  processing,	  and	  which	  are	  peripheral,	  
must	  be	  qualified	  based	  on	  the	  mode	  of	  language	  use.	  	  
	   A	  second	  way	  in	  which	  domains	  are	  constrained	  in	  conversation	  is	  through	  
representations	  of	  the	  perspective	  of	  one’s	  dialog	  partner.	  In	  conversation,	  
interlocutors	  form	  representations	  of	  common	  ground	  (Clark	  &	  Marshall,	  1978;	  
1981)	  that	  are	  subsequently	  used	  to	  guide	  language	  processing	  in	  a	  manner	  
dependent	  on	  the	  form	  of	  a	  given	  utterance.	  Whereas	  interpretation	  of	  a	  noun	  
phrase	  in	  an	  imperative	  such	  as	  Hand	  me	  the	  cheese	  narrows	  the	  referential	  domain	  
to	  entities	  in	  common	  ground	  (cheeses	  that	  we	  both	  know	  about),	  interpretation	  of	  
a	  question	  such	  as	  Where’s	  the	  cheese?	  narrows	  the	  domain	  to	  information	  in	  
privileged	  ground—that	  is,	  the	  location	  of	  the	  cheese	  in	  question	  (Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  
et	  al.,	  2008;	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  2009b;	  Nurmsoo	  &	  Bloom,	  2008).	  Representations	  of	  
common	  ground	  are	  established	  through	  interactive	  processes	  of	  introducing	  and	  
establishing	  information	  as	  shared	  (Clark	  &	  Schaefer,	  1989;	  Roque	  &	  Traum,	  2008;	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2009;	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  2009b),	  with	  some	  sources	  of	  information	  for	  common	  
ground	  providing	  stronger	  evidence	  of	  joint	  knowledge	  than	  others	  (Clark	  &	  
Marshall,	  1978).	  According	  to	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  (2012),	  representations	  of	  common	  
ground	  vary	  in	  a	  gradient	  fashion	  depending	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  evidence	  for	  the	  
assumption	  of	  mutuality.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  common	  ground	  is	  gradient	  
are	  findings	  that	  addressees	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  rely	  on	  representations	  of	  common	  
ground	  in	  non-­‐interactive	  settings	  where	  common	  ground	  is	  less	  well	  established	  
(Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  2009a;	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  &	  Fraundorf,	  submitted).	  Referential	  
understanding	  is	  generally	  impaired	  for	  non-­‐interactive	  compared	  to	  conversational	  
language	  (Branigan,	  Catchpole,	  &	  Pickering,	  2011;	  Foxtree,	  1999;	  Schober	  &	  Clark,	  
1989;	  Wilkes-­‐Gibbs	  &	  Clark,	  1992),	  and	  speakers	  show	  sensitivity	  to	  characteristics	  
and	  naturalness	  of	  the	  dialog	  partner	  (Lockridge	  &	  Brennan,	  2002;	  Kuhlen	  &	  
Brennan,	  2010;	  see	  Kuhlen	  &	  Brennan,	  2013).	  Taken	  together,	  these	  findings	  
provide	  strong	  initial	  evidence	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  language	  processing	  is	  different	  in	  
interactive	  settings	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  theoretical	  conclusions	  of	  interest.	  	  
	   At	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter,	  I	  described	  two	  different	  experiments	  that	  
used	  lexical	  competition	  (cohort)	  effects	  to	  examine	  language	  processing.	  The	  study	  
by	  Trude	  and	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  (2012)	  used	  a	  non-­‐interactive	  paradigm	  in	  which	  
participants	  listened	  to	  approximately	  700	  trials	  over	  the	  course	  of	  2	  hours.	  On	  each	  
trial,	  participants	  saw	  4	  pictures	  on	  the	  screen,	  and	  heard	  one	  of	  two	  pre-­‐recorded	  
voices,	  a	  male	  and	  a	  female,	  refer	  to	  one	  of	  the	  pictures,	  as	  in	  Click	  on	  back.	  The	  goal	  
of	  the	  experiment	  was	  to	  examine	  if	  listeners	  could	  learn	  a	  particular	  characteristic	  
of	  the	  male	  talker’s	  voice,	  that	  the	  /æ/vowel	  in	  bag	  was	  raised	  to	  /eɪ/	  only	  before	  
/g/	  (e.g.,	  bag	  is	  pronounced	  /beɪg/).	  The	  results	  of	  this	  experiment	  showed	  that	  
learners	  were,	  in	  fact,	  able	  to	  learn	  this	  second-­‐order	  phonemic	  constraint	  and	  that	  
as	  a	  result,	  when	  the	  male	  (but	  not	  the	  female)	  talker	  was	  speaking,	  fixations	  to	  the	  
cohort	  competitor,	  the	  bag,	  were	  reduced	  (but	  not	  eliminated).	  This	  talker-­‐specific	  
effect	  was	  subtle,	  yet	  the	  result	  still	  obtained	  in	  this	  non-­‐interactive	  paradigm.	  How	  
might	  have	  the	  results	  have	  changed	  in	  interactive	  conversation?	  
The	  results	  reported	  by	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  and	  Tanenhaus	  (2008)	  suggest	  that	  
during	  an	  interactive	  conversation,	  depending	  on	  the	  referential	  domain,	  the	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competition	  that	  was	  eliminated	  by	  a	  learned	  vowel	  shift	  might	  not	  have	  been	  there	  
to	  begin	  with.	  Outside	  the	  context	  of	  conversation,	  utterances	  produced	  by	  the	  
experimenter	  elicited	  standard	  cohort	  competition	  effects	  (Allopenna,	  et	  al.,	  1998).	  
How	  did	  conversation	  shape	  this	  effect?	  It	  eliminated	  it.	  Unlike	  the	  reduction	  in	  
cohort	  competition	  seen	  in	  Trude	  and	  Brown-­‐Schmidt	  (2012;	  and	  other	  non-­‐
interactive	  paradigms	  examining	  constraints	  on	  language	  interpretation;	  e.g.,	  Dahan	  
&	  Tanenhaus,	  2004;	  Dahan,	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  Creel,	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  McMurray,	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  
cohort	  competition	  was	  completely	  eliminated	  during	  interactive	  conversation.	  This	  
effect	  was	  interpreted	  as	  a	  referential	  domain	  effect:	  pragmatic	  constraints	  
narrowed	  referential	  domains	  to	  small,	  task-­‐relevant	  areas	  of	  the	  workspace,	  with	  
the	  result	  that	  lexical	  competition	  processes	  were	  largely	  eliminated.	  
What	  are	  the	  implications	  of	  these	  findings	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  lexical	  
competition	  resolution	  and	  language	  processing	  in	  general?	  The	  research	  reviewed	  
in	  this	  chapter	  suggests	  that	  interactive	  conversational	  settings	  provide	  a	  rich	  
source	  of	  information	  typically	  not	  available	  in	  the	  non-­‐interactive,	  scripted	  settings	  
routinely	  employed	  in	  psycholinguistics	  research.	  Conversations	  take	  place	  within	  a	  
context	  that	  includes	  gaze,	  common	  ground,	  and	  a	  discourse	  history,	  and	  that	  
dramatically	  constrains	  referential	  domains,	  improving	  the	  efficiency	  and	  success	  of	  
language	  understanding.	  One	  implication	  is	  that	  problems	  typically	  seen	  as	  
fundamental	  to	  language	  processing,	  such	  as	  the	  resolution	  of	  lexical	  competition,	  
may	  be	  relatively	  minor	  problems	  in	  conversational	  settings	  where	  domains	  are	  
routinely	  constrained	  (Brown-­‐Schmidt	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  2008),	  where	  talker	  identity	  
and	  preferences	  limit	  the	  candidate	  referents	  (Creel,	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Creel,	  2014),	  or	  
where	  physical	  cues	  such	  as	  eye	  gaze	  give	  away	  the	  speaker’s	  referential	  intentions	  
(Hanna	  &	  Brennan,	  2007).	  Thus,	  a	  key	  contribution	  of	  research	  on	  interactive	  
conversation	  is	  to	  suggest	  changes	  in	  the	  relevant	  focus	  of	  experimental	  work	  in	  
language	  processing.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  suggestion	  would	  be	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  a	  focus	  
on	  how	  word	  recognition	  processes	  resolve	  competition	  between	  large	  numbers	  of	  
candidate	  words,	  and	  towards	  a	  focus	  on	  understanding	  how	  interlocutors	  avoid	  
lexical	  competition	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  e.g.,	  through	  domain	  circumscription.	  In	  doing	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so,	  it	  will	  become	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  domains	  are	  
constrained.	  	  
What	  does	  this	  mean	  for	  standard	  research	  paradigms?	  The	  results	  of	  
research	  in	  conversational	  settings	  do	  show	  that	  language	  processing	  is	  altered	  by	  
the	  context	  of	  conversation,	  and	  suggest	  that	  some	  problems	  that	  might	  seem	  
significant	  in	  unnatural,	  decontextualized	  settings	  are	  more	  modest	  in	  interactive	  
conversation.	  However,	  standard	  research	  paradigms—including	  the	  use	  of	  
decontextualized	  language—play	  numerous	  essential	  roles	  in	  psycholinguistics	  
research:	  These	  studies	  afford	  the	  incredibly	  well-­‐controlled	  study	  of	  very	  specific	  
aspects	  of	  language	  processing.	  Research	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  sentences	  are	  
interpreted	  given	  verbs	  and	  noun	  phrases	  with	  particular	  affordances	  (e.g.,	  Wilson	  
&	  Garnsey,	  2009;	  Garnsey,	  et	  al.,	  1997)	  would	  likely	  be	  near-­‐impossible	  to	  do	  well	  in	  
a	  completely	  unscripted	  conversational	  setting.	  Similarly,	  understanding	  how	  
listeners	  learn	  features	  of	  a	  talker’s	  native	  accent	  and	  use	  that	  information	  to	  guide	  
on-­‐line	  interpretation	  (e.g.,	  Dahan,	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Trude	  &	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  2012)	  
would	  likely	  be	  challenging	  in	  unscripted	  conversation	  because	  the	  measure	  of	  
interest—lexical	  competition—would	  likely	  be	  eliminated	  by	  conversational	  
constraints.	  Progress	  can	  be	  made	  through	  the	  pairing	  of	  traditional,	  well-­‐controlled	  
studies,	  with	  those	  conducted	  in	  more	  naturalistic	  settings.	  Insights	  and	  basic	  
observations	  can	  be	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  studies	  of	  natural	  conversation,	  which	  can	  
then	  be	  tested	  in	  more	  controlled	  settings	  using	  standard	  paradigms.	  In	  cases	  where	  
findings	  from	  natural	  conversation	  do	  not	  extend	  to	  scripted	  settings,	  further	  
experimentation	  can	  identify	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  to	  observe	  the	  phenomena	  of	  
interest,	  thereby	  informing	  the	  mechanisms	  involved.	  Blended	  methods,	  such	  as	  
situations	  in	  which	  conversations	  are	  partially	  scripted	  (e.g.,	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  2012),	  
or	  in	  which	  the	  participant	  speaks	  with	  a	  confederate	  participant	  (e.g.,	  Hanna	  &	  
Tanenhaus,	  2004;	  cf.	  Kuhlen	  &	  Brennan,	  2013)	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  particularly	  useful	  in	  
such	  situations	  as	  they	  afford	  control	  of	  key	  features	  of	  the	  interaction,	  while	  
allowing	  other	  features	  of	  the	  interaction	  to	  unfold	  naturally.	  	  
In	  short,	  language	  use	  is	  fundamentally	  altered	  by	  conversational	  context,	  
and	  as	  I	  have	  argued,	  conversation	  is	  the	  most	  basic	  site	  of	  language	  use.	  As	  a	  result,	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building	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  language	  processing	  will	  require	  extensive	  study	  of	  
language	  processing	  in	  unscripted	  conversational	  settings.	  While	  studies	  of	  
language	  use	  in	  conversation	  are	  irreplaceable,	  significant	  advances	  in	  our	  
understanding	  of	  language	  processing	  will	  also	  continue	  to	  require	  carefully	  
controlled	  experiments	  in	  non-­‐interactive	  settings.	  Whether	  the	  results	  of	  these	  
experiments	  extend	  to	  language	  processing	  in	  conversation	  can	  subsequently	  be	  
investigated	  using	  conversational	  paradigms.	  Finally,	  in	  addition	  to	  being	  a	  test-­‐bed	  
for	  the	  generalizability	  of	  results	  from	  standard	  paradigms,	  conversational	  studies	  
can	  also	  be	  used	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  observing	  and	  documenting	  novel	  phenomena,	  which	  
can	  then	  be	  studied	  more	  carefully	  in	  controlled	  settings,	  creating	  a	  feedback	  loop	  
between	  the	  two	  approaches.	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